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Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional DuLy to Supervise, 124 Yale L. J. 1836 (2015).
Pat Gudridge
Gillian Metzger is convinced of "[t]he central importance of supervision." "Supervision and other systemic
features of governmental administration with which it overlaps ... are fundamental in shaping how an agency
operates and its success in meeting its ... responsibilities." (P. 1840.) Nonetheless "constitutional law stands
largely aloft from the reality of administrative governance, with the Supreme Court refusing to subject systemic
features of government operations to constitutional scrutiny." (P. 1841.) This dissonance preoccupies Metzger's
article.
Available lines of thought, we know, lie right at hand. The Article II Take Care Clause jumps out as one
beginning. Anti-delegation worries, originating in structural preoccupations, suggest another accessible
constitutional skein. Metzger's observations drawing out these threads make for easy reading. (Pp. 1874-1904.)
The problem, she thinks, lies largely with courts and their adjudicative inhibitions. In both administrative and
constitutional law, ideas of review, "cases" and "controversies," parties to disputes, resolution and finality, and
so on-all work against thinking through matters of system, supervision, "rightful hierarchy," and so on. Judges
are inclined to start with-are prone to hesitating absent-investigations of individual instances. Although she
maps possible occasions for taking up questions of supervision directly, Professor Metzger acknowledges that
there's not much chance of provoking large-scale change in judicial orientations (and maybe shouldn't be). Her
several discussions, here too, are searching and extensive, thoughtful and clear. (P. 1859-70, 1904-09, 1914-18.)
The article is nonetheless not a ninety-page shrug. Law works itself out, of course, in processes other than
adjudication. Metzger identifies good reasons for executive officials and legislators to take firmer hold of the
duty to supervise. (P. 1927-32.) But it may also be enough constitutionally, her eaders are led to understand, if
judges working within administrative and constitutional law put to use the idea of the duty to supervise as
something like an "aside" (not Metzger's own word; see the new compilation edited by Jason Potts and Daniel
Stout, Theory Aside). Professor Metzger writes with quiet, dry wit:
Administrative law ... offers an important means by which courts could require agencies to pay
greater attention to their supervisory obligations without assuming responsibility for enforcing
those obligations in the first instance. The vehicle would be the standard APA challenge to agency
action as arbitrary and capricious.... (P. 1919.)
Appearance and action, she thinks, do not always (and seemingly need not) proceed in parallel in administrative
law:
... [A]n administrative law approach to the duty to supervise would require changes in current
administrative law doctrines.... Notably, however, courts often appear to respond to presidential
involvement in their application of administrative law scrutiny without being open about doing so
or offering a justification for their approach. As a result, although acknowledging the duty to
supervise might entail changes in stated doctrine with respect to presidential administration, it may
not require much change in current administrative-law practice. (P. 1926.)
Even given all this indirection, even if little would change in administrative law in practice, Metzger stresses
that "acknowledging" the duty to supervise would be a marked change. "[I]ncorporating a duty to supervise into
administrative law could produce a fundamental reorientation of judicial review of agency action. ... Rather
than targeting specific decisions or actions, judicial review would scrutinize programmatic structures and
broader aspects of agency policy and functioning." (P. 1920.) But this change would be notable mostly from the
constitutional perspective.
Failure to articulate administrative law's constitutional underpinnings leads to a false perception of
constitutional law as separate and distinct from other forms of law and of agencies having little role
as independent constitutional enforcers. Failure to acknowledge the complicated interplay among
courts and agencies with respect to constitutional enforcement also makes it difficult to develop an
account of the proper bounds of this relationship. (1912)
It is not just that making explicit the constitutional law duty to supervise would alter the face of administrative
law. Our sense of what constitutional law "is" reshapes itself too.
Constitutional law in the modern administrative state does not have hard edges allowing for a clear
demarcation between that which is constitutional and that which is not. Rather, constitutional law
today is a porous entity. Constitutional requirements mingle with numerous forms of
subconstitutional aw, often functioning more as background norms than as direct commands. This
means that constitutional implementation will centrally involve other government institutions. It
also means that courts will inevitably engage in law creation as they seek to enforce constitutional
concerns indirectly. (P. 1933.)
Water music! What wonderfully baroque minimalism! But there is also substantial practical fall-out, Professor
Metzger suggests, providing a notable headline example:
Precluding prospective and categorical articulation of immigration enforcement policy and
priorities is tantamount to insisting that nonenforcement decisions be made by lower-level
officials.... Acknowledging a constitutional duty to supervise thus indicates that presidential efforts
to direct nonenforcement on a categorical, prospective, and transparent basis can have strong
constitutional roots. ... [E]xecutive-branch implementation of the duty to supervise seems likely to
result in greater and more overt instances of presidential direction. (P. 1929.)
The President as "Great Helmsman" a la Mao? Bolingbroke's "Patriot King"? Not quite, of course: "Given that
a core part of the duty to supervise is insuring legal accountability, such presidential policies must accord with
governing statutory requirements or have a basis in the President's constitutional authority." (P. 1929.) We
glimpse here especially clearly the deep complexity resonating throughout Metzger's discussion. There is not
just administrative law and constitutional law; not just administrative legal form and practice; not just direct and
indirect constitutional aw; but also an always present duality within constitutional law in substance-the duty
to supervise always coexists with, is always in interplay with, other constitutional texts and concerns.
"The Constitutional Duty to Supervise" is-notwithstanding its length and intricacy-a proof of concept
exercise. There is much therefore that is left out. For example, administrative law figures only very generally:
there is no close look at its own jurisprudential controversies, no sense of its reformations and counter-
reformations, no attention to long-running doctrinal perplexities like Chevron. There is not much attention to
how, within constitutional law itself, the Fourteenth Amendment-its "due process of law" and "equal
protection of the law" formulas-might interact with the duty to supervise in state and local law settings (for
example, not much attention to DeShaney or Castle Rock); not much sense of supervision as a key problem with
respect to police, prisons, etc.; no sense of how deep history-race, gender, and other profound "asides"-might
press hard on ideas of what "right supervision" should be. With respect to the federal scene, moreover, there is
not much attention to competing models: OMB insistence on cost-benefit analysis as an ever-present rationality
maybe reducing the need for presidential supervision as such (surprisingly little discussion also of Cass Sunstein
's remarkably ambitious, inter-related works and pomps); statutory administrative pluralism as introducing a
medium for judicial review grounded in versions of subject-matter jurisdiction, pretty much independent of
administrative law per se, permitting apt matching of problems and agencies, again inter alia.
Not criticism-not really. In the end, rather, this: Gillian Metzger has attempted and landed a long jump.
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